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ABSTRACT 
Matching grants are commonly used to influence the bundle of public goods provided by 
governments. We design a contingent valuation experiment to determine the value individuals place 
on improved recreational facilities under a matching grant proposal. The experiment provides an 
opportunity to examine preferences given the public good exists in an active and well-defined market, 
and the valuation experiment is perceived as meaningful to public policy. We estimate a mean 
willingness-to-pay for park improvements of $8.30, far less than the implied tax increase of $21 
provided by local politicians opposed to the project, but nearly double the actual tax increase for the 
average property owner. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intergovernmental grants have for a long time been a means for federal and state governments 
to influence expenditures and the mix of services provided by local governments. Categorical 
matching grants are generally the most effective way to cause local governments to increase the output 
of a particular service, because the matching requirement effectively reduces the price of the target 
good relative to other publicly provided goods and relative to the prices of private goods (see Guttman 
(1978) and Comes and Sandler (1986)]. The matching grant produces both an income effect and a 
substitution effect inducing the community to spend more on the target good. The offer of a 
categorical matching grant by a private benefactor should produce essentially the same result as a 
similar intergovernmental grant. 
This paper examines citizen reaction to the offer, by a private benefactor. of a categorical 
matching grant to a small town in North Carolina. The proposed grant requires a 100 percent local 
government match for the improvement of a recreational part: facility. Since the local government is 
already spending approximately 10 percent of its $10 million budget on recreation, the opportunity 
exists for funding the match by shifting recreational expenditures rather than increasing taxes. The 
situation is complicated somewhat by the fact that. as a condition of the grant, the donor will 
participate with the town government in the establishment of an independent authority to control the 
park development and operation. The grant proposal, including the question of who will control the 
expenditures, has generated considerable controversy in the community. 
We develop a contingent valuation experiment to examine whether willingness-to-pay for the 
part: improvements under this matching grant proposal can provide useful infonnation to guide local 
officials in similar situations. 1 The literature on contingent valuation has argued that nonmarket 
valuation is substantially improved if two conditions are met: (1) the good exists in an active and 
well-defined ma!Ket; and (2) the valuation experiment is perceived as being meaningful to policy 
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decisions [Cummings et al. (1986)]. In this paper we examine the value of improved recreation 
facilities given both conditions are fulfilled. First, there is a high degree of community awareness of 
the good and the question of improvements had been publicly debated over a six-month period. 
Second, the experiment is meaningful to respondents since it is public knowledge that all monies 
collected through higher taxes would be matched dollar-for-dollar by a closed-ended matching grant up 
to $75.000 per year. Respondents were asked to consider various alternatives including total rejection 
of the proposal, reducing other expenditures in order to pay for the project, raising taxes to cover the 
town's cost, and some combination of reducing other recreational expenditures and raising taxes. 
Contingent valuation allows us to estimate the amount by which taxpayers would be willing to 
increase their tax bill to pay for the project. Using a closed-ended elicitation mechanism (i.e .. 
dichotomous yes/no response to alternative willingness-to-pay amounts). the overall mean willingness-
to-pay (WTP) has a point estimate of $8.30 and is statistically different from zero at a I percent 
significance level. The mean WfP of those in favor of the proposal (34.3 percent) is likewise 
statistically significant at just over $18. But, for those opposed to the proposal. the estimated mean 
WTP drops to under $2 and is not statistically different from zero, even at a 25 percent significance 
level. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model of willingness-to-pay for 
improved parks. Section 3 describes the site background and design of the contingent valuation 
experiment. Section 4 presents summary statistics, estimation procedures, and parameter estimates. 
Finally, Section 5 contains our concluding comments. 
2. THE CLOSED-ENDED CVM MODEL 
Consider a representative household who selects a level of private consumption X to maximize 
utility U(X.Q), where Q is an exogenous level of a nonmarket commodity, subject to a budget 
constraint. Formally, the consumer is assumed to solve 
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(1) V(M.Q.P) =Max (U(X.Q) I M <: PX. Q preassigned} 
X 
where V(M.Q,P) denotes the household's indirect utility function. M is Beckerian full income and P is 
the unit price of X. Following the random utility model in Hanemann (1984) and Johansson eta/. 
(1989), it is assumed that V(-) is unknown with 
(2) V(M,Q,P) = Z(M,Q,P) + e 
where E[e] = 0, and E is the expectations operator. 
While the indirect utility function is unobserved, the discrete (or closed-ended) contingent 
valuation method relies upon the consumer's willingness to accept or reject changes in the vector 
(M.Q,P) in order to identify the structure of preferences. Consider the household's response to a 
change in the preassigned level of Q from Q0 to Q'. with an accompanying reduction in personal 
income of A.2 The consumer will accept this change if it leads to an increase in utility; that is. 
(3) l(Q0,Q 1;A) = { 
Z(M - A,Q1.P) + e1 2: Z(M,Q0.P) + Eo 
0 otherwise 
where I(Q0,Q1;A) = 1 denotes acceptance of the offer and eo and e1 are random variables. Discrete 
choice econometric estimation procedures can be used to estimate the parameters of Z using observa-
tions on I(Q0,Q1;A).3 An individual household's willingness-to-pay for the change in Q from Q0 to Q' 
is defmed as the equivalent surplus solving:• 
(4) V(M-WTP,Q1,P) = V(M,Q0,P) . 
Substituting in equation (2) and rearranging, WTP is implicitly defined by: 
(5) [Z(M - WTP,Q1,P) - Z(M,Q0,P)] + 11 = 0 
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where 11 = E1 - Eo . Following Johansson and Kristrom (1989), an explicit equation for WTP is then 
found using a linear approximation of Z around (Q0,M.P), with 
(6) Z(M- WTP,Q1.P)- Z(M,Q0,P) =a- ~WTP 
where a = <lZ(M,Q0,P)/<lQ and ~ = <lZ(M,Q0,P)/<lM. Both a and ~ are anticipated to have a positive 
sign.' Substituting (6) into equation (5) and solving for WTP yields: 
(7) WTP = CX/13 + 111~ 
The mean WTP for the proposed change in the provision of the nonmarket good is then given by' 
(8) E(WTP) = a/~ 
3. THE MATCHING-GRANTS EXPERIMENT 
The site selected for this experiment provides a real life situation with many aspects of a 
controlled experiment. The site, in the city of Lenoir, North Carolina, is a 34-acre park with a small 
pond encircled by a paved walking trail. The remainder of the park is undeveloped. A prominent 
family in the city proposed a 100 percent matching grant of $375,000 ($75,000 per year for five years) 
to provide further improvements in the park. Thus, for a tax expenditure of $375,000 the citizens of 
Lenoir could obtain park improvements of $750,000. The park would then be operated by a six-
member independent authority, with three members appointed by the city and three members appointed 
by the family. Since North Carolina law does not allow local officials to make such expenditure 
commitments that obligate future boards, the City Council voted to request special authorization from 
the state legislature to allow the expenditure. 
The proposed expenditure of tax funds and the issue of who would control the park generated 
considerable controversy, including the demand that the City Council conduct a special referendum to 
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obtain citizen input. In the absence of such a referendum. a survey was conducted to determine citizen 
preferences concerning whether the city should commit $375,000 to this project. A random sample of 
481 households was selected from city of Lenoir property tax listings and then matched with 
household names and street address in the Lenoir telephone book. Comparability between tax listings 
and telephone numbers was assured. The survey was designed so that the margin of error would be 
± 5 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval given 300 valid responses. Telephone interviews 
were successfully conducted with 301 households, or a 63 percent response rate. Nonresponse was 
generally a result of individuals not answering their phones7 
Data were collected on respondents' knowledge of and use of city recreational facilities. as 
well as familiarity with the matching grant proposal. Almost two-thirds of the respondents were 
familiar with the matching grant proposal.' Before.being asked specifically about willingness-to-pay 
for park improvements. respondents were given an opportunity to consider whether they favored the 
matching grant proposal and whether they would favor the use of tax revenues to pay the city's 
portion. Each respondent was initially told that his or her information would help the city develop the 
plan to improve the park. Following Crocker and Shogren (1991), this was done for three reasons: 
(a) to provide the common frame and editing whose importance Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
emphasize; (b) to inform the respondent about the value of careful, nonstrategic value formulation 
[Hoehn and Randall (1987)]; and (c) to increase the likelihood that the respondent would apply his or 
her experience of the park to plarmed improvements. Lenoir is a small town (estimated 1987 
population 14,621), and the issue had received extensive coverage in the local press. Also, a large 
proportion of the population were knowledgeable about the park in its current state. Therefore. our 
analysis was aided by the respondents' familiarity with the commodity in question.' In addition. 
citizens were presented with an ex ante, but nonhypothetical choice; that is, would they be willing to 
pay additional taxes to provide the city's share of the cost of park improvements? 
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By their nature. categorical matching grants are distonionary to the extent that they cause a 
change in the mix of public sector expenditures. Although we have no information on general 
distonionary effects in this case, our survey results indicate a strong preference for funding the project 
by reallocating expenditures in the city's recreation budget. Thirty-one percent of the respondents 
favored a reallocation of expenditures to cover the entire obligation for the city· s part of the project 
and an additional 29 percent favored some combination of a tax increase and reallocation of expendi-
tures. Further verification of the power of categorical grants to affect the distribution of public 
expenditures is provided by the willingness-to-pay analysis. 
The procedure used in this study to elicit willingness-to-pay is a variation on the traditional 
"closed-ended" survey approach. In the standard closed-ended question, the respondent is asked 
whether or not he or she would accept or pay a single specified amount (A). This dichotomous choice 
approach has been used successfully by Bishop et aL (1983). Loomis (1987). Cameron and James 
(1987) and Bowker and Stoll (1988). among others. The advantage of the closed-ended format is that 
it approximates the situation that most consumers face in usual marlcet transactions, "take-it or leave-
it" at the posted price. In addition, the closed-ended approach avoids asking the respondent to provide 
a "true" value of the good. However, the single closed-ended question limits the information revealed 
about an individual's willingness-to-pay, indicating only whether it is above or below a specified bid 
level (A). This in tum reduces the precision with which the analyst can measure and characterize the 
distribution of WTP in the target population. 
The approach used in this analysis increases the information available from each respondent by 
posing an increasing series of closed-ended questions. In general, this "one-way n-chotomous" choice 
approach begins by offering the individual a compensation level A1• If the individual responds "no", 
the questioning ends and the individual's maximum WTP is presumed to lie below A1• If they answer 
"yes", a higher compensation level (A2 > A1) is offered. Again. if they answer "no", the questioning 
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ends (with A1 s; WTP < A2), while a "yes" response leads to a new and even higher bid. The process 
continues until either the respondent has refused a bid or the highest bid (AJ has been accepted (with 
WTP ~ A,). This fonnat retains the basic dichotomous choice structure. while allowing the analyst to 
further categorize each individual's WTPw.n 
In the current application, three bid levels were used, with A1 = $15, A2 = $30, and A3= 
$45.00. 12 This range of alternatives included the amount that the majority of homeowners would 
expect to pay if the funds were raised through a six cent increase in the tax rate. The exact question 
used in the survey is included as an appendix. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
The series of discrete choice questions in the survey enables us to classify respondents into 
one of four mutually exclusive willingness-to-pay categories: 
• Category 1: I(Q0,Q1,15) = 0, I(Q0,Q1,30) = 0, and I(Q0,Q1,45) = 0 (i.e, WTP < 15); 
• Category 2: I(Q0,Q1,15) =I, I(Q0,Q1,30) = 0, and l(Q0,Q1,45) = 0 (i.e., 15 s; WTP < 30); 
• Category 3: I(Q0,Q1,!5) =I, I(Q0,Q1,30) =I, and l(Q0,Q1,45) = 0 (i.e., 30 s; WTP < 45); and 
• Category 4: I(Q0,Q1,15) = I, I(Q0,Q1,30) = I, and l(Q0,Q1,45) = I (i.e, WTP ~ 45) . 
Letting Di, = I if the respondent i belongs to WTP category j ( = 0 otherwise), Table I indicates that 
majority (66 percent) of the survey respondents belong to the first category, unwilling to pay even $15 
for the proposed park improvement. Approximately 27 percent were willing to pay $15 for the 
change. but not $30, thus falling into category 2. Of the remaining respondents, 5 percent fell into 
category 3 and 2 percent into category 4. 
Table 1 also presents the definitions and summary statistics for the additional explanatory 
variables obtained from the questionnaire. Over 60 percent of the respondents used some part of the 
city's recreational facilities including the park. Abcut 63 percent of the respondents were familiar 
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with the matching grants proposal. with nearly 34 percent in favor of the proposal. 13 The average age 
of the respondents was nearly 54 years. with an average of 2.6 household members. 
The property tax listing of the city provides additional indirect information on the wealth of 
the survey respondents, including their declared personal property (primarily the valuation of 
automobiles owned by the respondent) and real property valuations. Willingness-to-pay for the park 
improvement may vary by consumer wealth. The average tax valuation on real property in the sample 
equaled $29.300. while personal property averaged $6.250. 
4.2 Estimation Procedures and Parameter Estimates 
Knowledge of survey respondent i's location in the four WTP categories allows us to identify 
the range of values that 11, can take. Specifically, using the defmitions of Dj, and equation (3) we 
have: 
(9) 
T\; < Z(M,,Q0.P)- Z(M,-15,Q1.P) 
Z(M;.Q0,P)- Z(M,-15,Q1.P) s; T], < Z(M;,Q0,P)- Z(M,-30.Q1,P) 
Z(M;.Q0,P)- Z(M,-30,Q 1.P) s; T\; < Z(M;.Q0,P)- Z(M,-45.Q1,P) 
Z(M;.Q0,P)- Z(M,-45,Q1,P) s; 11, 
Substituting equation (6) into (9) yields: 
(10) 
11, < -a + fl(l5) 
-a + 13(15) s; T\; < -a + 13(30) 
-a + 13(30) s; T\; < -a + 13< 45) 
-a + 13< 45) s; 11, 
forD"= I 
for 0 2, = I 
for 0 3, = I 
for D" = I 
forD"= I 
for o,. = I 
for 0 3, = I 
foro.,= I 
Assuming that 11 is normally distributed, the corresponding log-likelihood function is a generalization 
of the traditional probit specification, with 
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(11) >£ = L, { o,,<t>[-a. + ~(15)] + o,,{<t>[-a. + ~(30)]- <t>[-a. + ~(15)]} 
+ o,,{<t>[-a. + ~(45)]- <t>[-a. + ~(30)]} + o",{1- <t>[-a. + ~(15)]}} 
where <t>(x) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variate. 
Table 2 presents the results of estimating the model in equation (11). Column 1 lists the 
parameter estimates for the model using all 290 respondents in the sample. 14 As expected, the 
marginal utility of income is positive (i.e., ~ > 0) and statistically different from zero at a 1 percent 
level. The implied mean willingness-to-pay for the overall sample (i.e .. CX/l3) is likewise positive at 
$8.30 and statistically significant." 
In addition to these overall results. the basic model was also estimated for several alternative 
sub-samples of the survey population: (a) columns 2 and 3 group the sample according to their 
familiarity with the proposal; (b) columns 4 and 5 establish sub-samples classified by the household's 
use of city recreational facilities; and (c) columns 6 and 7 divide the sample into subgroups according 
to their opirtion (favor or oppose) on the proposal to improve the park. In each case, the marginal 
utility of income term (~) remains positive and statistically significant, with considerable similarity 
across the various population subgroups. However, substantial differences arise when comparing the 
mean WTP estimates. For example, those who favor the proposal were found to have a substantially 
higher mean WTP (at $18.07) than those opposed to the proposal. The opposed group's mean WTP 
of $1.75 is not statistically different from zero at a 10 percent significance level. A likelihood ratio 
test of the equality of the parameters in the two samples, reported in the last row of Table 2 is rejected 
at a 1 percent significance level. 
A similar difference arises when comparing those who use recreational facilities to those who 
do not, with those using the facilities having a significantly higher mean WTP. Finally, comparing 
those familiar with the proposal to those unfamiliar with the proposal, the differences are not as stark. 
Both groups have statistically significant mean WTPs at the 5 percent level. While those unfamiliar 
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with the proposal do have a larger mean WTP. the test of equality between the two sub-samples is 
rejected only at a 10 percent level, but not at the 5 percent significance level. 
The tests reported in Table 2 indicate the importance of respondent characteristics on their 
mean WTP for the park improvement. To test the impact of these characteristics jointly, the basic 
model is expanded, allowing the intercept term to be a function of respondent characteristics. 
N -
Specifically, a in equation (7) is replaced by [a+ L:y.CZ"ri- ZJ], where Z., denotes individual i's 
k=l 
value for the kth characteristic (k = USEANY. FAMILIAR. FAVOR. AGE, MEMBERS, REAL. and 
PERS) and z, denotes the mean value of Z., in the sample. 16 Table 3 presents the resulting parameter 
estimates. for the overall sample and the individual subsamples. 17 
The addition of the conditioning variables to the model has linle impact on the basic results. 
As in Table 2. the marginal utility of income is consistently positive and statistically different from 
zero at a I percent level. The mean WTP in the overall sample has changed little. from $8.30 in the 
basic model to $8.25 in the expanded model. The relative size and significance level for the mean 
WTP estimates in population subsamples are also consistent with those in the basic model. 
Turning to the y, parameter estimates. the coefficients generally have the expected signs.'' In 
particular, respondents who use recreational facilities in the town have a higher probability of a "yes" 
response to the willingness-to-pay offer (i.e., YusEA.w > 0) than those who do not use recreational 
facilities. This corresponding parameter (YusEANY) is statistically significant for all subsets of respon-
dents except for those familiar with the proposal and those opposed to the proposal. Similarly, those 
in favor of the proposal have a consistently higher probability of responding "yes" to a willingness-to-
pay offer. Familiarity with the proposal appears to have little additional impact on the individual's 
decision making process. with 'YFAMn.IAR being consistently insignificant in the various sub-samples. 
Of the ·remaining respondent characteristics included in the model, age (AGE) and personal 
property wealth (PERS) emerge as important factors. Older respondents are found to be less inclined 
II 
to accept the proposed park improvements. with YAGE being consistently negative and statistically 
significant for the overall population and many of the subsamples. Wealthier households, as indirectly 
measured by their personal property holdings, were more likely to accept a given willingness-to-pay 
proposal. The remaining customer characteristics, household size (MEMBERS) and real propeny 
wealth (REAL), are generally insignificant in their impact on WTP and response to the proposed park 
improvement. 
Finally, for each division of the sample, Table 3 repons a likelihood ratio test of the equality 
of the parameters in the two subsamples. As in the basic model. this restriction is rejected at a 10 
percent significance level for all three sample divisions, and at higher significance levels for the 
"use/not-use" and "oppose/favor" divisions. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Local governments are typically faced with a difficult task in trying to measure how citizens 
value panicular projects. Listening to vocal advocates and vocal opponents of a project can often be 
confusing and may not provide much information about the extent to which the average voter values 
the project. Likewise, a voter referendum on the project, in addition to being expensive, will probably 
reflect the views of only those voters who are strongly opposed or strongly in favor of the project, 
leaving the decision makers relatively ignorant of the value that the average voter attaches to the 
project. As an alternative. we have designed a contingent valuation experiment to verify whether 
surveys can be expected to generate valid information to guide policy decisions by local governments. 
Our results suggest that well-designed experiments in an active market may provide useful information 
to help guide expenditure and tax decisions by local policy makers considering specific public sector 
projects. 
Finally, note that the efficacy of contingent valuation depends on information, both internally 
provided by the experimenters and externally promoted by parties interested in the provision of the 
12 
public good. While researchers can control internal infonnation through policy design institutions and 
payment mechanisms. control of external infonnation is another matter altogether. One question raised 
by this experiment is the extent to which local leaders may influence the outcome of a referendum by 
releasing information to the public. The mayor was quoted three times in the Lenoir News-Topic. 
October 19. 20. and 24. 1988, as stating that completing the park project (i.e .. raising $75,000 per year 
for five years) would require a six-cent per $100 of valuation increase in the city property tax rate. 
Applying the rate increase to the estimated average property valuation for all respondents in our 
sample households results in an expected increase of $21.29 in the average household tax bill, far in 
excess of the estimated average mean willingness-to-pay. 
But the actual increase required to fully fund a $75.000 per year increase in the city's budget 
is generally less than the estimated mean willingness-to-pay. With total property valuation of over 
$614 million, the city would need an increase of 1.22 cents per $100 of valuation to fund its 
obligation for the park project. This increase would amount to $4.33 for the average household in our 
sample. If a referendum had been held. the implied six-cent tax rate increase may have resulted in its 
defeat, even though most households indicated a WI'P. in excess of the actual increase necessary to 
fund the city's obligation. Given most respondents were aware of the publicly projected cost which is 
five times greater than the actual cost, it suggests an intriguing avenue for future research on the 
political economy of external information and contingent valuation. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Dli = 1 if respondent i falls into WTP .655 .476 
category 1 (i.e., WTP < 15) 
=0 otherwise 
D2i = 1 if respondent i falls into WTP .268 .444 
category 2 (i.e., 15 s WTP < 30) 
=0 otberwise 
D3i = I if respondent i falls into WTP .055 .229 
category 3 (i.e., 30 s WTP < 45) 
=0 otberwise 
D,, = 1 if respondent i falls into WTP .021 .143 
category 4 (i.e .. WTP :<: 45) 
=0 otberwise 
USEANY, = 1 if respondent i uses city's recre- 0.614 .478 
ational facilities 
=0 if respondent i does not use city's 
recreational facilities 
FAMILIAR, = 1 if respondent i is familiar witb pro- 0.631 .483 
posal 
=0 if respondent i is not familiar witb 
proposal 
FAVOR; = 1 if respondent i is in favor of pro- 0.351 .488 
posal 
=0 if respondent i is in favor of pro-
posal 
AGE, Age of respondent i 53.9 15.3 
MEMBERS, Number of members in household i 2.57 1.27 
REAL, Tax valuation on real property 29.3 35.2 
( $l,(XJO 's) for respondent i 
PERS, Tax valuation on personal property 6.25 6.41 
($1.000's) for respondent i 
Table 2. Estimated ?ammeters - Basic Model 
Parameter All Respon- Familiar 
dents with Pro-
posal 
a .so~r· .275 
(.122) (.50) 
p .061"" .054"" 
(.005) (.006) 
N 290 183 
Mean WTP 8.30"" 5.07" 
. ( 1.5 I) (2.37) 
x' c2 d.f.) ---
!Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
*Statistically signilicant at the 5 percent level. 
•• Statistically signilicant at the I percent level. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Sample 
Not Familiar Do Not Use Use 
with Proposal Recreational Recreational 
Facilities Facilities 
.900"" .130 .809"" 
(.217) (.317). (.149) 
.073"" .070"" .063"" 
(.009) (.017) (.005) 
107 112 178 
12.24 •• 1.86 12.68"" 











(2.58) ( 1.62) 
82.94"" 
Table 3. Estimated Par.uneters - Exp;mded Model 
Sample 
Parameter All Respon- Familiar with Not Familiar Do Not Use Use Oppose Favor 
dents Proposal wi lh Proposal Facilities Facilities Proposal Proposal 
a. .646"" .398"" 1.17"" .248 -.963 •• .146 1.53"" 
(.143) (.174) (0.28) (_472) (.170) (.197) (0.22) 
~ .078"" .069"" .101 .. .092"" . on·· .073 .. .086 .. (.006) (.008) (.013) (.029) (.006) (.099) (.009) 
YusEANY .565 .. . 316 1.29 .. .457 .887 .. (.200) (.270) (0.36) (.284) (.322) 
YFA.\fii..lAR. -.091 .308 .230 -.303 .239 (.170) (.351) (.204) (.264) (.271) 
YFAVOR . 992 .. 1.08 .. .562' .926" .98 r· (.166) (022) (.305) (.368) (.206) 
' YAGE -.0 17" -.022" -.011 -.016 -.0 17' -.011 -.018' (.007) (.009) (.010) (.013) (.008) (.009) (.0 10) 
YMEMBERS .048 .010 .024 -.066 .069 .159' -.086 (059) (.073) (.! 36) (.198) (.063) (.()92) (.083) 
YPERS .044"" . 0331 .071 .. .086 .. .034" .051" .037' (.014) (.017) (.0 19) (.031) (.016) (.0 19) (.021) 
Yi<EAL .004 -.002 .010' -.002 -.003 -.004 .004 (.003) (.003) (.005) (.009) (.003) (.005) ( .lXl4) 
Mean WTP 8.25 .. 5.75 .. 11.49"" 2.69 12.52 .. 2.00 17.93 .. 
( 1.38) (2.05) (175) (4.33) ( 1.51) (2.50) ( 1.52) 
1 x' (8 ct.n I --- 14.64' 17.29" 45.01 .. 
t Statistically signilicmlt at a 10 percent level * Statistically signilicant at a 5 percent level** Siatistically signillcant at a I percent level 
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ENDNOTES 
I. See Cummings eta/. (1986), or Mitchell and Carson (1989) for a detailed discussion on the use of 
contingent valuation for valuing nonmarket goods. 
2. In the current application, the change in the public good (i.e., the park improvement) is conditional 
on the matching grant. The role of the matching grant in the CVM offer is to enhance the perceived 
probability that Q will in fact be increased from 0! to Q', thus reducing the potential hypothetical bias 
in the questionnaire responses. 
3. See, for example, Maddala (1983) for a description of these techniques. 
4. See Hanemann (1984) for a detailed discussion of the derivation of WfP in this context. 
5. Note that, since ~ = az;aM = av;aM, this parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the 
marginal utility of income. See Kristrtim (1990, p. 67). 
6. Johansson and Kristrtim (1988) note that in the simple linear model the mean and median willing-
ness-to-pay estimation coincide: in non-linear models, however, they do not. However, Johansson et 
a/. (1989) conclude that the mean measure is the preferred measure to employ in cost-benefit analysis 
because the mean is consistent with Pareto efficiency, although the mean is not robust toward tail 
behavior [see Kristrom (1990), Chapter 4 for details]. 
7. The rule for the survey was that each telephone number was tried three times: twice on the same 
evening and once the next evening. 
8. Respondents who were unfamiliar with the proposal were read a statement outlining the terms of 
the proposal. 
9. The experiment designed followed Cummings et al.'s (1986) recommended reference operating 
conditions (ROC) to help facilitate accurate value formation by respondents. The ROCs are: l) 
respondents must understand and be familiar with the commodity to be valued; 2) respondents must 
have had or be allowed to obtain prior choice experience at valuing the consumption levels of the 
commodity; 3) there must be little uncertainty to avoid distortions from respondents using heuristic 
decision devices: and 4) willingness-to-pay bids should be elicited, not willingness to accept. 
10. The choice of n must reflect the tradeoff between refining the WfP categories and losing the 
survey respondent's interest and/or attention. Investigating this tradeoff is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
11. Tilis procedure represents a limited form of the traditional bidding method and is similar in spirit 
to the "double-bounded" dichotomous choice method developed in Hanemann (1985) and Hanemann et 
a/. (1991). The double-bounded approach differs in that it uses only three bid levels and the bidding 
process begins with the middle bid (our A,). Depending upon their response to this bid, the household 
is offered either the lower bid (A1) or the higher bid (A3). Both methods attempt to further categorize 
each survey respondent's willingness-to-pay. For n=3, the only difference lies in the order in which 
this information is extracted. In the notation of Hanemann eta/. (1991), A1 corresponds to Bf, A2 
corresponds to B,, and A3 corresponds to B~. The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for 
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pointing out this similar methodology. 
12. Our contingent valuation design is similar to the model of a policy referendum with individual 
costs for voters [See Hoehn and Randall (1987, p. 237) or Mitchell and Carson (1989, p. 149)]. But 
in contrast to a pure one vote referendum. we provided each respondent the opportunity to "vote" on 
three increasing cost levels. Our objective was to obtain a more detailed estimate of the respondent's 
likelihood function than would be provided with the one-vote referendum. Therefore, we did not 
explicitly state that the project would be implemented if a plurality of the respondents approved it. 
13. Respondents who were opposed to this park improvement totalled 34.3 percent of the sample. 
with 31.3 percent of the respondents being neither in favor of nor opposed to the improvement. 
14. Data from 11 of the survey respondents could not be used due to incomplete responses. 
15. As indicated in equation (8), the mean WTP is a nonlinear function of the estimated parameters. 
The standard errors reported in Tables 2 and 3 for the mean WTP are based upon first order Taylor 
series approximations. Simulations procedures, described in Krinsky and Robb (1986.1990) and Kling 
(1991), were also used to compute these standard errors. For each model, 25,CXXJ iterations were used. 
In all but one case, the simulated standard errors were within 5 percent of Taylor series approxima-
tions. The one exception occurs for the "do not use" subsample model, where the simulated standard 
errors for WTP were significantly larger (7.43 for Table 2 and 259 for Table 3). However, the 
differences between the two methods do not alter the basic conclusions of the analysis. 
16. Deleting the means from each characteristic allows us to interpret a as the intercept associated 
with the average customer in the sample. 
17. The sample sizes for each regression are the same as in the basic model. 
18. The likelihood ratio test was conducted for each sample subgroup, testing the hypothesis that 
y, = 0 for all i. This hypothesis was rejected at a I percent significance level for each subsample and 
for the overall population. 
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APPENDIX: ONE-WAY TRICHOTOMOUS WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY QUESTION 
"9. Suppose taxes were raised to support this improvement. how much would you be willing to pay 
per year in increased property taxes? 
$15 <IF YES, GO TO $30 AMOUNT> 
<IF NO, GO TO QUESTION lO> 
$30 <IF YES, GO TO $45 AMOUNT> 
<IF NO, GO TO QUESTION lO> 
$45 <GO TO QUESTION 10> 
9(A) YES ____ (!) 
NO (2) 
9(B) YES ____ (l) 
NO (2) 
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